This
article offers a unique insight into the perplexing situation in
Libya post the February 2011 Revolution. It was written by a
friend of the LCU and posted on the London Based Libya Al-Mostakbal
web site on 08 August 2015.
http://libyaprospect.com/index.php/2015/08/10/perfect-trap-courtesy-of-the-cia/
http://www.libya-al-mostakbal.org/news/clicked/76888
08/08/2015
The chaotic
conditions in Libya and the consequent effect on the flow of
illegal immigrants to Europe in addition to the unchecked
continuous founding of the Islamic State (ISIL) terrorist groups
in the country, would be more than convincing reasons for a much
more pro-active role for the EU in resolving the Libyan crisis.
The flow of desperate illegal immigrants from the shores of Libya
to southern European coastline is turning into a serious security
matter as well as an unacceptable human tragedy where masses of
desperate people including children and infants perish when flimsy
over crowded boats frequently capsize in the Mediterranean.
Illegal immigrants
will one day (if not already happened) include ISIL members with
missions in European cities. It is inconceivable that these
possibilities have not been considered by the EU decision and
policy makers. Yet, while we see expression of concern about the
situation in Libya and the recent increase in surveillance in the
Mediterranean to detect immigrant boats, it is hard to see how
these measures alone will challenge the immediate fundamental
problems on the ground. Fundamental matters such as improving the
security infrastructures in Libya, improving border security,
building a better dialogue with the Libyan authorities and
enabling an effective strategy to face the threat of ISIL are in
need of urgent attention. This obvious conclusion will not have
been missed by EU decision makers. Delays in resolving the
internal disputes and disarray in fighting ISIL can only provide
more opportunities for terrorist groups to spread and enforce
their positions to carry out more atrocities not only in Libya but
also in accessible areas.
The recent
massacre in Sousa (Tunisia) could not have happened without
terrorist groups present in next door Libya.
This essentially means that the EU and North African countries now
have a shared interest in putting their joint weight to advance
proper and urgent resolutions to the complex Libyan case. At
present, we see frequent expression of concern but not a serious
drive to take alternative effective routes to the stumbling UN-led
initiatives. There are obvious questions that need answers. For
example the troubled rapport between Europe and the Libyan
authorities is crippling all possibilities of effective
cooperation at a time when one would expect straight forward
collaboration and much higher levels of help in dealing with the
illegal immigration issue and dangers from ISIL. The absence of a
ground of understanding
between Libyan
authorities and EU countries is damaging to the interests of both
parties and it is a highly time-sensitive issue which is allowing
matters to worsen rapidly.
In a recent get
together with my long-time friend Mr Mohammed Ben Ghalbon, the
Chairman of the Libyan Constitutional Union, I put the above
questions to him to see his views on the problem of the troubled
EU-Libyan relationship. I asked Be Ghalbon what were the real
reasons in his view behind the reluctance of the EU countries to
change their position from passive observers to active
participants in resolving the Libyan political case and in dealing
with other issues of mutual interests and whether he thought the
expression of concern by the EU regarding the spread of ISIL in
Libya matched the response from individual European countries and
from the EU commission.
Ben Ghalbon is a
veteran of Libyan politics and established the Libyan
Constitutional Union in 1981 to oppose the Gaddafi regime. He has
written many landmark pieces on Libyan politics and accurately
predicted many of the course changing developments long before
they happened. His insight in Libyan political and societal
trends has been refreshingly unique and revealing.
Mr Ben Ghalbon
decided to move out of the contemporary Libyan political arena the
day the National Transitional Council abandoned our 1951
Constitution and announced the interim constitutional declaration
in August 2011. Ben Ghalbon was certain then that the moving away
from the 1951 constitution and the declaration by the NTC was to
lead the country to endless series of disasters with grave
consequences. He remained uninvolved since because he refuses to
be part of cohorts irresponsibly steering the country into chaos
and certain anarchy. Sadly most if not all of his fears are
materialising.
Here is the response by Mr Ben Ghalbon to the above questions:
The Libyan elected parliament appointed General Hefter as the head
of the army thinking that the army ranks (remnants of Gaddafi’s
army) will respect Hefter’s high rank and fall into a disciplined
national army. The parliamentary leaders who made this
contentious appointment were unable to see the heavy baggage
Hefter carries in the eyes of the international community. Hefter
is effectively on the terrorists list by the Libyan society and
also by the Chadian nation due to the atrocious war he led in Chad
on behalf of Gaddafi. Thousands of Libyan boys and Chadian
soldiers perished in that futile war. This is a legacy of
Hefter’s contribution to the Gaddafi regime that is still vivid in
the minds of all Libyans and Chadians. Hefter’s appointment by
the Libyan authorities (leaders of parliament) as the head of the
national army dismissed the concerns of the Libyans, but also
gravely failed to see that Hefter is an untouchable toxic
individual in the eyes of the outside world. Hefter has no
credentials to qualify him for such a high profile position. The
appointment is especially wearisome because the Libyan authorities
are fighting on many controversial
fronts and the
questions of acceptability and credibility are always present.
Hefter’s CV as a soldier does not make a happy reading. The
military humiliation in Chad in a senseless war cannot be
forgotten. But the failed soldier does have a history of a
particular category since he was taken prisoner in Chad. He was
plucked out of Chadian jails by the CIA and taken to be stationed
in Virginia till 2011. His contacts in the CIA would have been a
useful card in securing a position in the anti-Gaddafi military
ranks after Feb 2011 despite his old past. The CIA contacts were
the clincher credentials that made Hefter irresistible to the
parliamentary leaders. Hefter must have demonstrated to the Libyan
parliamentarians his access to CIA officers and the tacit support
he enjoyed from the agency. On the other side of the equation,
the American operatives would certainly have invented
opportunities in meetings and informal chats with the Libyan
parliamentary leaders to register their implicit (but definite)
approval of Hefter. To the Libyan leadership, approval by the CIA
of their most senior army officer is tantamount to being handed a
voucher to permanent power in the country and a certain victory
over their rivals The parading of Hefter on the international
stage a few months ago by facilitating state visits to Jordan and
UAE perhaps lacked subtlety but it did convey the message from the
CIA to the unquestioning reliable allies in the area: “this man is
ours”. Broadcasting implicit but assertive endorsement of
“friendly” Libyan persons and parties is an established old
tradition in the CIA’s policy for Libya. In the 1980s they went
far in making their allies in the Arab World clearly understand
their support of a particular Libyan opposition party. The
opposite was also practiced in a crusade-like action to exclude
from the arena other opposition groups the CIA disapproved of.
The carefully planned manipulation and preparations by the CIA
throughout the period up to 2011 intended to prepare human
resources and opportunity options to install “friendly” Libyan
faces into positions of power and exclude “unhelpful” parties.
The real motive
behind the CIA’s tacit support of Hefter’s appointment was to lure
the Libyan government into a perfect trap. While making the Libyan
leaders understand that Hefter has their support, the CIA knew
full well that the international community (especially the
Europeans) and the UN Security Council cannot be seen to be arming
an army headed by an alleged “terrorist” and a man of this
colourful history. This is a no brainer. But the Libyan
officials for various reasons could not see this. All they were
led to see was the CIA’s endorsement of Hefter. The Libyans have
repeatedly vigorously defended the decision. The excessive
decorations of the old soldier meant to acclaim the appointment
officially and publicly. The commitment by the government to
Hefter has gone over the top in so many respects. They will find
it very difficult to retreat from this position. The Libyan
authorities were effectively steered into a trap with serious
consequences.
The communications between the Europeans and the Libyan government
representatives is probably fraught with compound
misunderstandings which developed into problems that stopped vital
cooperation essential for resolving mutually important and
time-sensitive matters. For example the Europeans cannot believe
that the Libyans are not aware of the
burden of toxic
Hefter. They may think that the Libyans appointed Hefter at this
high profile position was deliberately made in defiance. The
Europeans are likely to be thinking that the insistence of the
Libyan government on keeping Hefter in his position is merely due
to pointless defiance and intransigence. On the other hand, the
Libyans might be wondering why the (imperialist) Europeans refuse
to supply them with arms and help them deal with matters of mutual
importance.
The inability of
the Libyan officials to see Hefter as a problem is symptomatic of
the legacy after 42-years of Gaddadism. The Libyans have been left
with a deep lack of insight politically and to some degree
socially. This inability to distinguish between appropriate and
otherwise and the incompetence to overcome personal inclinations
in favour of the nation’s needs are tragically prevalent among the
vast majority of decision makers in power. This legacy is not just
damaging to the prospects of ever having a pragmatic governing
system in the country, it also provides a fertile ground for
outside meddling in the country’s affairs. There is a common
culture of un-understanding of the issues. It is as if
rationality has given way to irrationality in an epidemic sort of
way.
Ben Ghalbon firmly
believes that the EU representatives have to take the above
personal “difficulties” into account when talking to the Libyan
officials. The fine line between advising and interfering is
often missed by the Libyans. The EU officials should be mindful
of being “firm” but “sensitive” at the same time in their
dialogue. Some sort of partnership is required to help the Libyan
government reduce the flow of potential African illegal immigrants
at several points along the route including upstream in the
Southern borders with Sudan, Chad and Niger.An effective
partnership can only be built if the trouble rapport is radically
improved.
Defeating ISIL can
only be achieved if the EU and the Libyan government become “one
party” in purpose and free of the CIA shackles which have so much
muddied the waters in all aspects of the Libyan case. Enabling
(aiding) the Libyan authorities to defeat ISIL, does not just
require weapons; it also requires building basic security
infrastructure, satellite surveillance capabilities, intelligence
and planning. The Libyan authorities have none of these
necessities and what little they have is completely corrupt. The
EU decision makers must now see that leaving the Libyan case to
the CIA is no longer an option and have to realise that the
“perfect trap” will remain in place for as long as it can last.
The dangers from illegal immigration and from Islamic State (and
combined) are risks to the Libyans and Europeans. Evidently,
neither is a priority to anyone else.
To the question regarding the wholly destructive CIA policy for
Libya in its extremely vulnerable phases in post-Gaddafi era and
the obvious endless lurching from one disaster to another, Ben
Ghalbon said a chaotic and destroyed Libya as a state will offer
the CIA several valuable bargaining chips to gain long lasting
influence and dominance in the area. This is a
“project Libya”
that has been in the making by the CIA for years. At present the
country is effectively a failed state, divided by warring
authorities, powerless to fight terrorist groups, the
dysfunctional infrastructure from Gaddafi has disintegrated, the
police force and the national army exist only in name and
generally conditions are worsening by the day. By the help of
many “reliable friends” among the cohorts in power, the CIA will
hold the country in this deteriorating condition until it becomes
an accepted fact (regionally and internationally) that there is no
return and radical measures will no longer appear objectionable.
The country will be in such a dreadful condition that drastic
damage control measures for the country might even become
desirable. This point is being achieved by allowing several
factors to operate including allowing terrorist groups to control
more territories, armed militia to become bolder in exercising
power, conflicts between factions become more diffuse and
irresolvable. However, the most important tool of all will be to
continue to enable more “reliable friends” to reach power and
decision making positions. This is certain to emphasise the
reality that the country is not just wrecked; it is also
politically hopeless for a long time.
The opportunities
to exploit the country’s geographic position and its wealth will
be easier to realise if the country continues to dismantle as a
state and becomes separated regions under the control of local
weak authorities unable to defend their areas and continuously
under threat from neighbours. The oil reserves are a huge asset
that will be ripe for exploitation by the CIA whether it is under
the control of regional weak authorities or ISIL. Oil from Libyan
ports cannot be exported or sold in the international market
without American consent. Areas with oil reserves and mineral ores
in the Southern West regions along the border with Algeria will be
valuable bargaining chips for securing concessions and support by
CIA from Algeria to secure bigger international influence both in
the region and farther a field. Blatant land annexation cannot be
justified under any circumstance but virtual occupation and
administration by Algerian authorities “temporarily” under the
pretext of security concerns will be sufficient to control a
territory rich in oil reserves. This will be hard to resist by
Algeria. The control of the oil-rich territory will naturally be
ostensibly temporarily to help Libya recover from chaos and
restore its state security infrastructure. The period of Libyan
recovery (in the hands of the CIA) can be stretched for years and
in the meantime Libyan oil is bumped into Algerian storage tanks.
The Eastern regions (Cyrenaica) will be the bargaining chip for
Egyptian support to CIA adventures in the region and further a
field. Egypt is bursting at the seams with exploding numbers in
the population and decreasing resources to feed and manage these
masses of jobless people. The idea of repatriation of several
millions of Egyptians of Libyan origin back to Cyrenaica will be
irresistible to Egyptian authorities. Some of these significant
numbers (famous tribes) fled famine to Egypt, but the majority
were in fact driven out from their homeland by other Cyrenaica
tribes after losing civil wars over a century ago. The tribes now
living in Western regions of Egypt still maintain many Libyan
traditions and dream of going
back “home” one
day. In order to relief the population and economic pressures,
there will be nothing the Egyptians will not do for the CIA, when
given the opportunity to shed a few millions of people into
Cyrenaica. The Cyrenaica authorities, whatever shape they will be
in at the time, will be weak and effectively separated from the
rest of the country and will have little say in the matter. This
repatriation of several million to the Eastern parts of Libya will
effectively evolve control of this oil-rich region to Egyptian
authorities. The numbers and technical skills of the repatriated
masses will dwarf the locals into insignificance. The region will
be administered by Libyans with Egyptians hearts and ears firmly
tuned to officials in Cairo. Cyrenaica will appear much as it had
been except that it has much improved security (a welcomed feature
by international institutions) and effectively a semi-detached
province of Egypt. Many of the repatriated population will be in
charge of infrastructure, economy and security and slowly the
present border with Egypt will become a mere line on the map. One
of the tragic aspects of this part of the CIA policy for Libya is
that, most if not all of the international power centres will
“welcome” the economic relief for Egypt because it is seen now as
“a problem” without a solution.
The spread of
Islamic terrorist groups in Libya, particularly ISIL, has made the
“project Libya” an easier objective to realise. The ISIL
phenomenon together with the internal wars between authorities in
the East and West, have made the project realisable with relative
ease. The many Libyan “helpful” friends of the CIA in their
complete unawareness of a treacherous scheme (or willingness to go
along regardless) are the critical delivery vehicles of the
project. The project Libya cannot be achieved without the many
willing folks.
The CIA plan is
not politics to enrich a favourite culture in a developing
country; it is a long standing strategy to deliberately degrade a
country in order to trade its assets for international leverage. A
manual may include: destabilise, destroy infrastructure, encourage
divisive policies and tribal zeal, demote values of national
accord, eliminate links to unity and steer the country toward
partitioning. Stealth permitting of armed militia to flourish and
design of power vacuum for terrorist groups to become ambitious
will create conditions in the country where a new reality becomes
a tolerated prospect and gradually develops into an only solution
that is in the best interest of the country and regional peace.
The country will be degraded (undone as a state) to strip its
assets and trade them for supremacy while the world watches
unaware. This is the model of project Libya, an asset stripping
project drawn by the boys in Langley offices. The stakes for the
CIA are unimaginably high. It has invested in this project since
late 60s and they are in no doubt that they can achieve their
objective. Libya’s assets are enormous and the country is in the
hands of easily deceived leadership. The country is sparsely
populated and it is in the right place. The CIA is confident that
it can exploit chunks of Libya as tradable assets to secure
loyalty from significant regional players for years to come to
support American policies and CIA adventures locally and around
the world. It will take relentless pressure and a string of
miracles to
dissuade the CIA from carrying on with this policy. This is if
anyone with persuading powers is prepared to look beyond the cover
and recognise the perils of the above analysis. The cover for the
scheme is breathtakingly simple; no one would believe that the CIA
would engineer such a devastating policy for Libya. It is too
fantastic. And to the casual observer: why? The assumption by the
CIA is that no one is likely to see through the series of events
apparently the result of policies by Libyans in charge or at least
no one will realise the truth until it is too late to reverse the
process. In any case, if all goes according to plan and with the
help of Libyan friends, the country might not look all that
different from the average third world state unable to overcome
the perils and complexities of modern fundamentalism and natives
battling for power.
Encounters with American officials over a period of time several
years ago left Ben Ghalbon in no doubt
that the CIA plans for Libya had been set to undo the country
years earlier, but the plans were not necessarily shared with the
White House or with The US Department of State. He suspects that
politicians in either institution would find it difficult to
approve such plans. For one reason, the shocking plans are
impossible to justify to a discerning public. CIA games and
adventures in Libya if fully exposed would be found to be in
breach of international laws and conventions, and most certainly
would not in line with the declared US policies. However, the CIA
is quite rightly confident that when the plan is completed and the
plum fruits are delivered, politicians of any colour will find it
irresistible to accept a new reality.
No one knows what
greater disasters will ensue following the degradation of Libya
into chaotic regions ready to trade off. The flourishing of ISIL
and trade in illegal immigration to Europe are examples of
unexpected consequences of deteriorated Libya. It remains to be
seen when the European countries will recognize the true
intentions of CIA policy for Libya and whether that will be
sufficiently strong cause to change their present submission to
the American dominance to independent action. In addition to
acknowledging the true intentions behind the American exclusive
dominance in the Libyan case and the dismissal of real and present
security risks to Europe from a dismantled Libya, the Europeans
will have to adopt a wholly independent new approach to the case
in which the goals are redefined and a better understanding with
the Libyan authorities is carved.
Ahmed S. Mesbah
London
08/08/2015
